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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NELSON CLAYTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
HAL S. BENNETT, STEW ART M. 
HANSEN and DONALD HACK-
ING as members of the Department 
of Business Regulation of the State 
of Utah, DEPARTMENT OF 
REGISTRATION and FRANK E. 
LEES as Director of the Depart-
ment of Registration, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the Architect's Licensing 
La \V. The District Court held the licensing law to be 
constitutional, and this appeal is taken from that judg-
ment. 
The present controversy arose out of an examination 
given by the Registration Department of the State of 
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Utah to the plaintiff~appellant, and others, on November 
27, 28, 29, and 30, 1951, for the purpose of ascertaining 
the qualifications of the examinees to practice the pro-
fession of architecture. The examination was conducted 
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which was formerly Chapter 1, 
Title 79. (R. 1, 13.) 
Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
purports to create a Registration Department within the 
Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah, 
and to set up rules and regulations for the licensing of 
members of the various professions, including architects. 
Sections 7 and 13 of that Chapter provide for "repre-
sentative committees'' for each one of the various pro-
fessions. Each such committee is to be selected from the 
practicing members of the particular profession it is to 
represent. Each committee is given the sole responsi-
bility for establishing the qualifications to be met by the 
applicants desiring licenses in the profession represented, 
as well as the sole discretion to set the standards for the 
examinations given such applicants. 
At the time of the examination herein referred to, 
plaintiff -appellant was a duly licensed professional engi-
neer and had degrees in both engineering and architec-
ture from the University of Utah. His educational quali-
fications to take the examination ,,~ere admitted and ac-
cepted· by the Department of Business Regulation. (R. 
16.) 
After the examination the ''architect's representa-
tive committee'' held that plaintiff-appellant had failed 
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to meet the standards fixed by said committee and he 
was refused a license to practice as an archi teet in the 
state of Utah. Subsequently, upon the petition of the 
plaintiff-appellant, and after a hearing on the matter, 
the Department of Business Regulation held that the 
"architect's representative committee" had violated 
certain of its rules in the conduct of the examination and 
granted plaintiff-appellant an opportunity for re-exami-
nation under the provisions of section 58-1-16, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. (R. 15, 16.) 
Plaintiff-appellant did not avail himself of the oppor-
tunity for re-examination, and on June 16, 1953, he 
brought. an action in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, state of 
Utah, praying for a declaratory judgment construing 
Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to be 
invalid. Among other things, he contended that there 
was an improper delegation of legislative powers insofar 
as it places on the" architect's representative committee'' 
the sole responsibility for establishing the qualifications 
for applicants for architects' licenses, and the sole dis-
cretion to determine the standards for the examinations 
given such applicants. The amendment to the Complaint 
further petitioned the court for an injunction perma-
nently enjoining the defendant-respondents from inter-
fering in any manner with the plaintiff-appellant in the 
practice of the profession of architecture. (R. 5, 8.) 
The cause came on for pre-trial on the 18th day of 
October, 1955, and, counsel having stipulated to the facts, 
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the court entered judgment for the respondents. This 
appeal is from the judgment so entered. (R. 16.) 
.STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PROFESSION 
OF ARCHITECTURE IS A PROPERTY RIGHT 
WHICH APPELLANT IS EXTITLED TO PROTECT 
BY RECOURSE TO THE COURTS. 
POINT II. 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS NO POWER 
TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A 
LEGISLATIVE ACT. 
POINT Ill. 
THE DECLARATORY AXD INJUNCTIVE PROCE-
DURE IS A CORR.ECiT PROCEDURE FOR CHAL-
LENGING THE CONSTITlTTIO~ALITY OF THE 
ST~\TUTES IN QlTESTIO~. 
POINT IV. 
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CH_._\PTER 1, TITLE 58, 
UTAH CODE ANNOT~\TED, 1953, CONSTITUTE AN 




rri-IE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PROFESSION 
<)F 1\RCHITE('iTURE IS A PROPERTY RIGHT 
WT-IICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO PROTECT 
BY RE(X)lTRSE TO rrHE COURTS. 
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In his complaint, appellant alleges that he is compe-
tent to engage in the profession of architecture, that he 
desires to engage in that profession, that the respondents 
are threatening to prosecute him criminally if he does 
so without a license, that the statute requiring a license 
is void, and that the appellant is being required by the 
respondents to forego the practicing of a lawful profes-
sion or run the hazards of a criminal prosecution. He 
asks the court to enjoin the defendants from enforcing 
or attempting to enforce the void statute, so that he can 
engage in a lawful occupation. 
The right to engage in the profession of architecture 
or to engage in practically any other type of business is 
a property right protected by the due process clauses of 
the State and Federal constitutions. This has been the 
consistent ruling of both the Utah Supreme Court and 
the United States Supreme Court. A recent pronounce-
ment by the Utah Supreme Court, which collects and cites 
many authorities on the subject, is Ruckenbrod v. Salt 
Lake County, 102 Utah 548, 113 P. 2d 325. The court said 
at page 560 of the Utah Reports: 
''The United States Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that citizenship in the United States 
carries with it certain privileges which are pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus an 
American citizen has the right 'to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pur-
suit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all 
positions are alike open to everyone, and that in 
the protection of these rights all are equal before 
the law.' Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277, 321, 
71 U.S. 277, 18 L. Ed. 376." 
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The Utah Court also quoted with approval from Smith 
v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 34 S. Ct. 681, 682, 58 L. Ed. 1129, 
as follows: 
" 'Life, liberty, property, and the equal protec-
tion of the law, grouped together in the Constitu-
tion, are so related that the deprivation of any 
one of those separate and independent rights may 
lessen or extinguish the value of the other three. 
Insofar as a man is deprived of the right to labor, 
his liberty is restricted, his capacity to earn wages 
and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied 
the protection which the law affords those who 
are permitted to work. Liberty means more than 
freedom from servitude, and the constitutional 
guaranty is an assurance that the citizen shall be 
protected in the right to use his powers of mind 
and body in any lawful calling.' '' 
The appellant is attempting to practice a lawful call-
ing. His right to practice that calling is a property right 
which is entitled to protection from the courts. 
POINT II. 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS KO POWER 
TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A 
LEGISLATIVE ACT. 
Section 36 of Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Anno-
tated, provides for a court review of any action taken 
by the Department of Business Regulation adversely 
affecting any applicant for an .. A.rchitect 's License. This 
section provides as follo,vs : 
'' 58-1-36. Recourse to the Courts. ...~\ny applicant 
for or holder of a. license, certificate, permit, stu-
dent or apprentice card or any person directly 
affected and aggrieved hy any ruling of the de-
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partment of registration, may "\\rithin thirty days 
after notice of such ruling institute an action in 
the district court of the county at the seat of 
government, or in the county of the aggrieved 
person's residence, against the director in his 
official capacity setting out his grievance and his 
right to complain. In his answer the director may 
set out any matter in justification; and the court 
shall determine the issues on both questions of 
law and fact and may affirm, set aside or modify 
the ruling complained of.'' 
A review taken pursuant to this section can only embrace 
such matters as were within the power of the Adminis-
trative Agency to decide. The administrative agency 
could not have decided the constitutional questions in-
volved in this action, and therefore, a statutory action 
to review that administrative agency's ruling could not 
embrace these constitutional questions. This is squarely 
set out by our Utah Supreme Court in the case of Eardley 
v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362. That was an action 
to review' a decision of the State Engineer. The authority 
for court review of the State Engineer's action is con-
tained in Section 73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953. A comparison of 
that language with the language of section 58-1-36 (above 
quoted) will show that the scope of the review is in both 
cases essentially a trial de novo. In the Eardley v. T'erry 
case, the Supreme Court said: 
'' ... 'Vhen an appeal is taken from the decision 
of the State Engineer in such a case, the trial 
court is required to determine the same questions 
de novo. It determines whether the application 
should be approved or rejected and does not fix 
the rights of the parties beyond the determination 
of that matter. The issues remain the same upon 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an appeal to this court. All that the district court 
or this court, on appeal from the district court, 
is called upon to do is to determine whether the 
application should be rejected or approved ... " 
* * * 
"It is not for the court, on an appeal from the 
decision of the State Engineer rejecting respond-
ent's application to decree to him any waters 
which he may be able to obtain by conserving and 
increasing the flow of the stream involved. It 
should simply determine whether the application 
was rightly rejected. In determining that ques-
tion, the court stands in the same position as the 
State Engineer did ... '' 
* * * 
''As above noted, the proceeding in the district 
court was by way of an appeal from the decision 
of the state engineer in rejecting respondent's 
application to appropriate water. Under the 
statute, section 1000-3014, R.S. 1933, when an 
appeal is taken from a decision of the state engi-
neer, it is the dut~T of the court to try the cause 
de novo. The court had no power in the cause to 
decree to the respondent any water he may be 
able to obtain in the future by conserving and in-
creasing the flov\T of the streams involved.'' 
POINT III. 
rrHE DECL.A_RATORl~ ~lND INJUNCTIVE PROCE-
DURE IS A CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR CHAL-
LENGING THE CONSTITUTION.A_LITY OF THE 
STATUTES IN QUESTION. 
rrhere is a. square utah holding to the effect that 
decla.ra tory and injunctive procedure is a correct proce-
dure to be follo,ved in challenging statutes of the kind 
here under dispute. The case is Broadben,t v. Gibson, 105 
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Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939. There the defendant was attempt-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the Sunday Clos-
ing Law. The defendants 'vere threatening .to prosecute 
plaintiff criminally for keeping his store open on Sunday. 
Plaintiff contended that the law was unconstitutional and, 
therefore, that he had a right to stay open on Sunday 
and to not be harrassed by criminal actions. The plaintiff 
filed what he entitled a. petition for a writ of prohibition 
to prohibit the various official from molesting his opera-
tion. The action was filed in the District Court. On 
appeal the propriety of using the writ was challenged. 
The Supreme Court devoted a major portion of its deci-
sion to the procedure which should be followed in chal-
lenging statutes of this type, and held that a suit for a 
declaratory judgment or for an injunction would prob-
ably have been a better remedy than the writ of prohibi-
tion. Its reasoning was that the writ is to be used only 
in extraordinary circumstances when no other remedy 
is available. The court said that the remedy of a petition 
for an injunction was available, and that these forms 
(injunction and declaratory judgment) provided ade-
quate remedies. The court then said that since this action 
vvas filed in the District Court, it could be treated as 
though it had been erroneously designated as a petition 
for a writ of prohibition. The court, thereupon, pro-
ceeded on appeal as though the petition had been one for 
injunctive and declarative relief, and proceeded to con-
sider the constitutionality of the statute. In so ruling, 
the Supreme Court said: 
''The defendants contend that if the writ may be 
issued under the facts presented, injunction is o b-
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tainable. Thus they argue, the petitioners do have 
an adequate remedy without the issuance of a writ 
of prohibition. While as a general rule the en-
forcement of a criminal statute would not be 
enjoined by injunction (28 Am. Jur. 372) there is 
one exception to this rule. An injunction will 
issue to restrain the enforcement of an unconsti-
tutional statute when such restraint is necessary 
to prevent irreparable damage to property.'' 
* * * 
' 'Another limitation to the use of injunction is 
suggested in a recent article by Borchard, 'Chal-
lenging Penal Statutes by Declaratory Action,' 
Vol. 52, Number 3, June, 1943, Yale Law Journal, 
in which the thesis is developed that the declara-
tory judgment is in certain cases superior to in-
junction for challenging the constitutionality of 
penal statutes.'' 
* * * 
''In the instant case the action was commenced 
in the district court and came to this court by 
appeal. It raised substantially the same points as 
a petition for an injunction would have done. 
Under the holding of Hoffman v. Lewis, 31 Utah 
179, 87 P. 167, and Clark v. Bramel, 57 Utah 146, 
192 P. 111, ,,~e may disregard the form and con-
sider this as though it "\Yere an appeal from an 
order refusing injunctive relief, \\~e believe that 
the various factors involved are sufficient to 
justify an examination of the merits of the case 
on this appeal. We, therefore, proceed to the 
merits.'' 
Of course, the tests for issuing a "\Yrit of prohibition 
are similar to those for issuing injunctive relief, in that 
in both cases the ordinary remedy at law must be inade-
quate. In addition, the writ of prohibition generally 
10 
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would require that there be a lack or excess of jurisdic-
tion, which is not required in the case of an injunction. 
There have thus been three methods of challenging the 
constitutionality of statutes. The ordinary citizen need 
not violate a criminal action and run the hazard of crimi-
nal punishment in order to determine whether or not he 
must comply with a statute, which he thinks is void. The 
Supreme Court has upheld in several cases the use of the 
writ of prohibition, but in Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, 
where the matter was thoroughly examined, the court 
indicated that the declaratory procedure or the injunctive 
procedure might be better, and in the Broadbent case, the 
court turned an action which was entitled as a writ of 
prohibition into an injunctive suit, and treated is as a 
petition for an injunction and proceeded to determine the 
merits of the controversy. 
The use of declaratory and injunctive or prohibitive 
procedures for testing the constitutionality of statutes is 
well accepted and often followed. See W allberg v. Utah 
Public Welfare Commission, 115 Utah 242 (declaratory 
judgment used to challenge validity of Utah's old age 
lien law); Sla.ter v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 456 ( declara-
tory judgment used to challenge validity of city ordi-
nance prohibiting sale of magazine subscriptions). See 
also Masich v. U. S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101 (declaratory 
judgment to have plaintiff's right to file common law 
action for disability from silicosis); and Gubler v. Uta.h 
State Teachers' Retirement Board, et aZ., 113 Utah 118 
(declaratory action to determine validity of statute relat-
ing to retirement benefits); Grenlund v. Salt Lake City, 
11 
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113 Utah 284 (declaratory action to determine validity 
of Sunday closing law. 
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. The amend-
ment to the complaint alleges that plaintiff must either 
comply with a void statute or in the alternative run the 
risks of criminal prosecution and punishment. This prob-
lem was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of 
Adolph Coors v. Liquor Control Commission, 99 Utah 26, 
105 P. 181. In that case, th~ Supreme Court issued a 
writ of prohibition to prohibit the enforcement of an 
unconstitutional statute relating to the bottling of beer. 
The propriety of using the writ was challenged, with the 
State contending that the petitioner had an adequate 
remedy. In answer to this the Supreme Court said: 
''The corporation here, if forced to its remedy by 
appeal, must enter upon a course of conduct 
which will subject it to criminal prosecution 
throughout the state, subject it to fines, if con-
victed, and to a possible forfeiture of its license, 
if it fails to pay the fines (sections 114, 150 and 
161). Should a forfeiture occur, it would mean 
the loss of the right to make sales held lawful by 
the Commissi~n as well as those held illegal. 
Under such circumstances ''e feel that to force 
the case through ordinary channels of procedure 
''"ronld be an injustice.'' 
Sinee the statutory procedure for a review of the 
Commission's action could not haYe determined the con-
stitutional questions involved, and since plaintiff had no 
adequate remedy at la,v, the proper procedure was to 
seek declaratory and injunctive relief. 
12 
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POINT IV. 
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CHAPTER 1, TITLE 58, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, CONSTITUTE AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGIS-
LATIVE POWERS. 
The present licensing laws for architects in the state 
of Utah have caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. On 
various occasions bills have been introduced in the legis-
lature in an attempt to improve the licensing procedure. 
For example, such a bill was introduced in the House of 
Representatives, H.B. 81, during the 1953 legislative ses-
sion. In 1954, H.B. 126 was introduced for the purpose of 
"enacting a new chapter relating to architects, the quali-
fications and examination of applicants for licenses to 
practice architecture . . . etc. '' This bill, as amended, 
passed the House of Representatives and subsequently 
passed the Senate. However, in the Senate the bill was 
amended, and, while the House voted to concur in the 
Senate amendments, it subsequently killed the bill on a 
voice vote. The entire matter has now been referred to 
the Legislative Council for study. 
The particular code sections presently complained 
of are cited for the convenience of the Court: 
"58-1-7. General duties.-It shall be the duty of 
the several representative committees to submit 
to the director standards of qualifications for their 
respective professions, trades or occupations 
requisite in applicants for license, and methods 
of examination of applicants. They shall conduct 
examinations at the request of the director to 
ascertain the qualifications and fitness of appli-
cants to practice the profession, trade or occupa-
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion for which the examination may be held, shall 
pass upon the qualifications of applicants for 
licenses, certificates or permit and shall submit in 
writing their findings and conclusions to the di-
rector.'' 
'' 58-1-13. Action by committee prerequisite to 
exercise of certain functions.-The following func-
tions and duties shall be exercised or performed 
by the department of registration but only upon 
the action a;nd report of the appropriate represen-
tative co1nmittee: (Italics added) 
(1) Defining for the respective professions, trades 
and occupations what shall constitute a school, 
college, university, department of university 
or other institution of learning as reputable 
and in good standing. 
(2) Establishing a standard of preliminary edu-
cation deemed requisite to admission to any 
school, college or university. 
( 3) Prescribing the standard of qualification 
requisite in applicants for licenses before 
license shall issue. 
( 4) Prescribing rules goYerning applications for 
licenses, certificates of registration, permits, 
student rards or apprentice cards. 
( 5) Providing for a fair and ":holly impartial 
method of examination of applicants to deter-
mine their qualifications to exercise the re-
spectiYe professions, trades or occupations. 
These sections violate the limitations imposed on 
the delegation of legislative po,vers in three respects: 1) 
The director of regulation can only make provision for 
the qualification of architects if a board created from 
practicing architects first acts; 2) The licensing power 
14 
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is delegated to an administrative agency without any 
standards having been prescribed; 3) Neither the direc-
tor nor the architects' representative committee are re-
quired to give each applicant uniform and equal pro-
tection. 
It is well established that the power to issue licenses 
may be delegated to an administrative body. However, 
there are well defined limitations to this power of dele-
gation. The general law, which is in accord \vith the Utah 
decisions, is stated in 53 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 
15, page 508, as follows : 
''Licensing enactments may validly establish a 
properly constituted body of officials for admin-
istrative purposes and may validly confer appro-
priate duties on such bodies or officials. The 
vesting of duties in administrative officials by an 
act or ordinance requiring a license or imposing 
an excise or license tax, however, must not amount 
to an unlawful delegation of legislative or judicial 
power, but in the application of this rule the con-
ferment of merely administrative duties is not 
obje-ctionable. Where discretion is to be exercised 
by administrative officials, proper standards or 
guides for the use of such discretion may, and, as 
a general rule, must be established by the enact-
t " men ... 
In this regard the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Rowell v. State,. 98 Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 563, stated as 
follows: 
"In Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 
579, 584, 71 A.L.R. 604, the court said: 
" 'It is a fundamental principle of our system 
of government that the rights of men are to be 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determined by the law itself, and not by the let or 
leave of administrative officers or bureaus. This 
principle ought not to be surrendered for conve-
nience or in effect nullified for the sake of expe-
diency. It is the prerogative and function of the 
legislative branch of the government, whether 
state or municipal, to determine and declare what 
the law shall be, and the legislative branch of the 
government may not divest itself of this function 
or delegate it to executive or administrative of-
ficers.' 
'' The court further said : 
'' 'The majority of the cases lay down the rule 
that statutes or ordinances vesting discretion in 
administrative officers and bureaus must lay 
down rules and tests to guide and control them in 
exercise of the discretion granted in order to be 
valid ... ' 
''And in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Com-
mission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 239, 35 S. Ct. 387, 
392, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 19160, it is said: 
'' 'The legislature must declare the policy of the 
la 'v and fix the leg-al principles which are to con-
trol in given cases: but an administrative body 
may be invested with the power to ascertain the 
facts and conditions to which the policy and prin-
ciples apply.' 
''But in the delegation of such authority the legis-
lature must clearly mark the course to be pursued, 
and the principles, facts, and purposes to serve 
as guide to enable the officer to carrv out, not his 
own 'vill or judgment but that of the ·legislature." 
It is also clear under the Utah cases that the discre-
tion to prescribe the qualifications and standards must 
reside in the administrative agency and not in some 
segment or group of society. This was the square holding 
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of the case of Revn.e v. Trade Commission., 113 Utah 155, 
192 P. 2d 563. In that case an administrative agency 
could only act to fix prices if 70 per cent of the barbers 
initiated a plan for fixing minimum wages, hours, etc. 
The court, in holding such provision unconstitutional, 
stated as follows: 
'' ... No doubt it can be said that no harm to the 
public can occur, as the board stands between the 
70% and that public, but, the law was not passed 
to grant a class certain benefits so long as the 
public was not injured. The law was passed to 
protect the public health and safety by authorizing 
the establishment of certain prices and hours in 
the public interest, and yet there is no way, on 
behalf of the public, to initiate such security if 
the specified majority of the barbers refuse, for 
selfish reasons, to act. No .other group of citizens 
may initiate the schedules. The board is not given 
power to act for the public upon its own initia-
tive ... " 
The discussions in both of the cases cited clearly 
demonstrate also that the provision for licensing must 
be such that the law itself will govern and so that each 
man will be treated equally and identically by the law. 
One of the fundamentals of constitutional law is that 
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment to the consti-
tution of the United States no state may deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum at page 995, in dis-
cussing this question, states as follows: 
"State and municipal legislation is subject to the 
constitutional requirement that no state shall deny 
the equal protection of the laws to any person 
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within its jurisdiction; and it is valid as comply-
ing with, or invalid as violating, this requirement 
accordingly as it does or does not, within the 
sphere of its operation, affect and treat alike, 
with equality and uniformity and without arbi-
trary or unreasonable distinction or discrimina-
tion, all persons similarly situated.'' 
And the following is taken from the same article, 16 Cor-
pus Juris Secundum, Page 1014: 
'' ... a state may not, under the guise of protect-
ing the public, arbitrarily interfere with private 
business, or impose unreasonable or unnecessary 
restrictions thereon. Any classification or dis-
crimination must not be arbitrary or· unreason-
able ; and the legislation must not be discrimina-
tory in the sense of applying unequally to persons 
pursuing or engaged in the same calling, profes-
sion, or business under the same or like conditions 
and circumstances. The object of legislation regu-
lating a business must be the public good and not 
benefit to individuals or classes~ and a statute 
allo,ving one class of persons to engage in what 
is presumptively a legitimate business, while deny-
ing such right to others, is unconstitutional unless 
it is based on some principle ''hich may reasonably 
promote the public health, safet~\ or welfare. 
''Legislation may be sustainable even where 
the enjoyment of certain rights is limited to per-
sons thereafter to be selected by the legislature 
or other governmental agency, or at least this is 
so "There the legislation fixt.~s standards and vests 
an official or department ''ith quasi-judicial 
po"\\rer to determine ''Thether the requirements of 
the statute haYe been met~ but it is otheru·ise as 
to a statule or o~rdin.ance U'hich does n-at prescribe 
any urnifo,rnl rules,. conditions, or regulations and 
confers on an officer, cornnz.ission, or tribu.nal 
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arbitrary authority and discretion to discriminate 
in favor of or aga.inst persons engaged in legiti-
mate business or occupation." (Italics added.) 
The statutes· in question are fatally defectiye in all 
three of the particulars above listed. There is absolutely 
no statutory standard prescribed to guide either the 
director or the architects' committee in fixing qualifica-
tions for persons to be licensed. The statute merely says : 
''It shall be the duty of the several representative 
committees to submit to the director standards of 
qualifications for their respective professions, 
trades or occupations requisite in applicants for 
license, and methods of examination of appli-
t " cans ... 
As was the situation in the Rowell case, the statute is 
utterly barren of any suggested standard of qualification 
which the administrative agency is to attempt to adhere 
to. Without legislative standard, the administrative 
agency can enforce its own will-not that of the legisla-
ture. It can have a changing standard of qualification, 
changing from applicant to applicant and from day to 
day. Further, the act expressly provides that the director 
may fix the qualifications and do the other things enumer-
ated in Section 58-1-13 "only upon the action and report 
in writing of the appropriate representative committee.'' 
There is thus no initiative left in the director. lie cannot 
initiate standards of qualification, but only may establish 
such standards upon the action and report of a committee 
of architects. If the board of architects takes no action at 
all, the director could not prescribe any qualifications. It 
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was this very thing which induced the court in the Revne 
case to hold that law void. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the sta-
tute in question is not constitutional because a) it sets 
forth no legislative standards, b) it makes the action of 
the director dependent upon the action of a committee of 
architects, and c) it has no assurance of equal and iden-
tical treatment to each applicant. 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By Edward W. Clyde 
James L. Barker, Jr. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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